Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries by David Genesove & Wallace Mullin
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries
Volume Author/Editor: Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter
Temin, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-46832-1
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/lamo99-1
Publication Date: January 1999
Chapter Title: The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
Chapter Author: David Genesove, Wallace Mullin
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10231
Chapter pages in book: (p. 103 - 144)3 The Sugar Institute Learns to
Organize Information Exchange
David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
3.1 Introduction
One ofthe central tasks ofa trade association is to facilitate the exchange of
information among firms. Such information may involve production and sale
data, or more direct information on demand conditions. Although this function
has attracted some attention in the economic literature, the models treat the
trade association as a "black box" that neutrally transmits verifiable informa-
tion that has been submitted by the firms. In practice, a workable information-
exchange agreement involves critical, concrete choices ofinstitutional design.
We consider the difficulties involved in constructing and carrying out such
agreements by examining the case ofthe Sugar Institute, the trade association
ofU.S. cane sugar refiners from 1928 to 1936.
A trade association is a peculiartype of"governance structure," to use Oliver
Williamson's phrase, that lies on the border between the market and the firm.
While member firms cooperate in certain dimensions, they retain indepen-
dence over both pricing and production decisions and internal information and
accounting systems. This division ofauthority inevitably gives rise to a conflict
between the collective interest offirms to share information and the individual
interest of each firm to withhold it. For example, if firms are colluding on
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prices, then there is a collective interest in having information available to
monitor and maintain collusion. But it remains in the individual firm's interest
to undercut the collusive price and cheat ifit can do so undetected. This tension
animated the Sugar Institute in both its design and implementation, and,
shortly after its formation, threatened to render impotent if not destroy the in-
stitute. Nevertheless, the members ofthe institute, operating through its estab-
lished framework, were gradually able to exchange information cooperatively
and to modify, with mixed success, industry practices.
The organization and operation of a trade association therefore involves
incentive problems that are muted if not absent when information is internal
to the firm.
1 First, firms must be induced to join. If nonparticipation is too at-
tractive, the association will unravel. Second, member firms must give truth-
ful reports of their information. A firm could violate the information-sharing
agreement either by nonreporting (failing to file a report), or misreporting (fil-
ing a false report). Lacking the coercive powers of a firm over its divisions, a
trade association must find other ways to induce the desired behavior of its
constituent firms. Finally, the association must protect the confidentiality of
any reported information not intended to be shared. These incentive problems
are difficult enough when firms are identical; they become more severe when
firms are heterogeneous, because that sharpens the divergence between the
firms' collective and individual interests.
The SugarInstitute was organized in a period ofdecreased demand for sugar
and substantial excess refining capacity. Similar circumstances fifty years ear-
lier had led to the consolidation of the industry, an option foreclosed in the
intervening years by the emergence of antitrust policy. Instead, the refiners
chose to form a trade association, a type of industrial cooperation then in its
heyday. As a substitute for a merger, a trade association is clearly inferior.
Indeed, throughout the life ofthe institute there were continual, though vague
and ineffectual, calls for real consolidations among the refiners to produce a
tighter oligopoly. Nevertheless, the institute did succeed in raising price, and
within a year had doubled the Lerner price index. But it soon ran afoul ofthe
antitrust laws. The Department ofJustice filed suit in March 1931. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York ruled against the Sugar Institute
in 1934, and the Supreme Court concurred in 1936.2
Information exchange served two roles for the SugarInstitute. The institute's
primary objective was collusion, and information exchange helped enforce the
institute's rules. The Sugar Institute never fixed prices or set either production
quotas or market shares. Its methods were more indirect. Through its Code of
1. There are ofcourse important incentive problems in managing information inside firms. For
example, if the performance of a division will affect the compensation of its managers, then the
general office may face problems in eliciting indications of poor performance. But the general
office still retains greater authority over information systems and greater auditing ability than a
trade association would possess over member firms.
2. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 Fed. Sup. 817 (1934), 297 U.S. 553 (1936).105 The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
Ethics, it promulgated and enforced rules oftrade whose purpose was to make
price cuts more transparent, and so detectable, as we discuss in a companion
paper (Genesove and Mullin 1997a). First among those rules was "open pric-
ing"-the requirement that firms offer no secret price discounts. Other rules
standardized contractual terms.
Some means of ensuring adherence to these rules was needed. The direct
monitoring of compliance through private investigation and auditing down-
stream firms' records and refiners' stocks was one route taken. Another was
information exchange. For example, refiners submitted production and deliv-
ery figures, and, for a time, sales figures, which the institute staff aggregated.
A firm could use these aggregate figures to monitor its share of industry de-
mand, and so infer secret price cutting ifits market share fell.
But information exchange was also an end in itself. Several refiners testified
at trial that the prospects ofobtaining credible industry statistical information
played an important role in their decision to join the institute, and the private
correspondence of the vice president of one firm shows his use of institute
data to benchmark his own firm's performance. The institute undertook other
collective actions, such as an industry-wide advertising campaign, and stan-
dardization of sugar grades. However, such activities were secondary, and
when the Supreme Court ruled against the Sugar Institute's primary actions, its
members chose to dissolve it.
The broader historical context for the Sugar Institute is found in the chang-
ing political and legal environment ofthe 1920s and 1930s, which saw the rise
and fall of trade associations, information-exchange agreements, and "open
price associations." With an initial impetus provided by Arthur Jerome Eddy's
1912 book The New Competition, 150 open price associations were operating
by 1921.3
From 1921 to 1928 Secretary ofCommerce Herbert Hoover played a pivotal
role in promoting a variety of cooperative, associational activities, including
industry trade associations. As documented by Hawley (1974, 1981), Hoover
promoted trade associations both directly, through the Department of Com-
merce's expanded jurisdiction, and indirectly, by influencing and persuading
other government entities to look favorably upon such organizations.
The greatest threat to these trade associations was posed by antitrust law.
Two Supreme Court decisions in 1921 and 1923 outlawed the information-
exchange activities ofthe hardwood-lumber and linseed-oil industries, and this
threatened to curtail significantly the number and activities of trade associa-
tions.4 In American Column andLumber Co., the Supreme Court found illegal
an information-exchange agreement in which members were required to sub-
mit weekly the details of individual sale transactions, including the price and
3. Federal Trade Commission Survey, cited in Whitney 1935, 40.
4. American Column andLumber Co. et al. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); United States
v. American Linseed Oil Co. et al., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).106 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
buyer for each sale, which the trade association then reported in full to all
its members.
In 1922 the Commerce Department countered this ruling by substituting its
own activities for those outlawed for trade associations. It collected more data
about individual industries than before, and for a period essentially acted as a
clearinghouse for data provided by private trade associations. Since under both
sets of arrangements the statistics were at least nominally collected by Com-
merce, compliant firms could not be prosecuted for an antitrust violation. Hoo-
ver also tried to convince the Department of Justice to accept the legality of
trade associations that engaged solely in the exchange of statistics. Attorney
General Harry M. Daugherty was resistant to this suggestion, but his departure
in 1924 paved the way for successors more sympathetic to Hoover's viewpoint
(Hawley 1974, 126, 136; Galambos 1966,93).
Moreover, the Supreme Court soon adopted a friendlier attitude. The Maple
Flooring and Cement Manufacturers cases of June 1925, while not directly
overturning American Column and Lumber Co., did significantly narrow the
scope of that earlier case's prohibitions.
5 There were some important differ-
ences offact that distinguished these latter cases from the earlier precedent. In
Maple Flooring, for example, individual members' reports to the trade associa-
tion on quantity sold, production costs, past prices received, and inventory
were first summarized or masked before being distributed to other members.
Also, the summary statistics were disseminated to the trade generally, and were
not limited to the members, as in the earlier case. But the Supreme Court's
more favorable treatment certainly reflected a changed economic and political
sentiment. The Courtitselfacknowledged in Maple Flooring, "Itis the consen-
sus ofopinion ofeconomists and many ofthe most important agencies ofGov-
ernment that the public interest is served by the gathering and dissemination,
in the widest possible manner, of information with respect to the production
and distribution, cost and prices in actual sales, of market commodities, be-
cause the making available of such information tends to stabilize trade and
industry, to produce fairer price levels and to avoid waste which inevitably
attends the unintelligent conduct ofeconomic enterprise" (582-83).
So by the time the U.S. cane sugar refiners met in 1927 to establish their
trade association, they had reason to expect a generally friendly reception from
the legal authorities.
Our study of the Sugar Institute complements other contributions to this
conference volume. We conceive ofthree objects offirm learning: technology,
production techniques, and organizations and incentives. Usselman (chap. 2)
and Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (chap. 1) have examined learning about both
technique and technology. Mishina (chap. 4) documents how knowledge about
a production process was created and implemented. In contrast, we study a
technologically stagnant industry. The sugarrefining industry did not introduce
5. Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association et al. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
Cement Manufacturers' Protective Association et al. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).107 The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
new production technologies in the decades surrounding the formation of the
SugarTrust.6 Sugar-industry members did learn during the period ofthe Sugar
Institute, but it was learning about extrafirm organizational design and the
management of incentives. Organizational innovation and its application is as
noteworthy as the introduction of new technologies and techniques. Charles
and Frank Duryea built and operated the first automobile in the United States,
Henry Ford introduced mass production, but it is Alfred Sloan whom Chandler
(1962) and Williamson (1975) celebrate for successfully addressing General
Motors' incentive problems through the multidivisional or M-form organiza-
tional design.
Much of our information about the internal workings ofthe Sugar Institute
comes from the papers ofLouis V. Place, Jr., vice president ofMcCahan Sugar
Refining, and that firm's representative as a director ofthe Sugar Institute. He
prepared notes on meetings of the Sugar Institute's Executive Committee,
board ofdirectors, and Enforcement Committee, and these notes are available
from January 1929 to July 1930.
7 They were prepared to circulate only within
a circle of about six McCahan executives, so they represent a fairly candid
account ofthe institute's motivations and activities. Place offered strong views
to his McCahan colleagues as to how the institute should operate, so he was
far from a disinterested observer. We also have some correspondence to and
from Place.8 We also use testimony from the trial record.
We highlight our findings as we foreshadow the organization of this paper.
In section 3.2 we discuss more fully the incentive issues involved in organizing
and maintaining a trade association. Section 3.3 addresses the Sugar Institute's
formation and early development.
Section 3.4 is the core ofthis chapter. It discusses how the institute learned
and evolved as it attempted to effect firm information exchange. The organiza-
tional design ofthe Sugar Institute was fairly decentralized yet created a struc-
ture for collective decision making. There were disagreements among the firms
over what information should be shared. Production and delivery statistics
6. A 1945 sugar handbook's list of the apparatus used in cane sugar manufacturing contains
nothing introduced beyond the nineteenth century (Spencer and Meade 1945, 72), and Yano (1982,
54) states, "It is generally agreed that the basic technologies in sugar refining were evolved in the
late 19th century and no major innovations have occurred since then." Most telling is that the
amount ofraw sugar (whose standard grade was 96 percent pure sugar, or sucrose, and 4 percent
water and impurities) required to produce 100 pounds of refined sugar (which is 100 percent
sucrose) remained unchanged for decades. Because there is some loss of sucrose in the refining
process, 100 pounds of raw sugar will produce less than 96 pounds of refined sugar. To produce
100 pounds ofrefined sugar took between 107 and 107.5 pounds ofraw at the turn ofthe century
(U.S. Industrial Commission 1900, vol. 1, part 2),107 pounds ofraw in the Sugar Institute period
(U.S. Tariff Commission 1934, 109), and still 107 pounds by 1971 (Robert R. Nathan Associates
1971,5).
7. The bibliographic citation is Place, W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining and Molasses Company,
box 11, Sugar Institute, memoranda and notes of meetings. We will cite these records herein as
Place Memoranda. A few stray memoranda up through June 1931 are also included.
8. The bibliographic citation is Place Records, W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining and Molasses
Company, box 1, M. E. Rionda Correspondence, boxes 2-3, General Correspondence. We will cite
these records herein as Place Correspondence.108 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
were circulated with minimal difficulty, but sales statistics were shared for only
a short period. The largest firms were the least willing to share information,
particularly sales information. Heterogeneity among firms, of which the two
salient characteristics were size and location, also played a critical role in de-
termining membership in the institute. Some divergent interests were recon-
ciled within the structure ofthe institute, while others remained outside.
Section 3.5 compares the institute to the sugar refiners' proposed code under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Comparing the two codes reveals
what lessons about organizing information exchange the industry assimilated.
Section 3.6 concludes by showing how one firm used the information provided
by the institute, and evaluates the overall success ofthe institute.
3.2 Incentive Issues in Information-Exchange Agreements
Collusive agreements are constantly in danger of being undermined by se-
cret price cuts. Since a collusive agreement results in a price above marginal
cost, participant firms have an individual incentive to undercut this price
slightly and receive a larger share ofindustry demand and profits. A firm cheat-
ing on the collusive arrangement in this way will want to do so secretly in order
to avoid retaliation from other producers.9 Anything that makes detection of a
secret price cut more likely therefore serves to enhance collusion. The Sugar
Institute's Code of Ethics had as its first requirement that "sugar should be
sold only upon open prices and terms publicly announced." Adherence to this
requirement and the truthful provision of prices and production levels would
clearly make cheating more evident.
Although we find this collusion explanation for the Sugar Institute the most
compelling, we do not dismiss the possibility that efficiency concerns may
have also played a role in the institute's information exchange. A number of
theoretical papers have shown that there are nonstrategic incentives for firms
to agree to information exchange. Ifeach firm receives only a noisy signal of
aggregate market demand, then exchanging·signals will result in a more pre-
cise signal for all participants, allowing them to make better-informed produc-
tion and inventory decisions, thereby reducing expected production costs. In-
formation sharing also increases the correlation of firm strategies, precisely
because this allows firms to base their decisions on commonly shared informa-
tion. The combination ofthese effects can be both privately and socially bene-
ficial as illustrated by Kirby (1988).
The collusion and efficiency explanations should not be viewed as mutually
exclusive, however. It is possible that the exchanga, ofproduction information
both supported collusion and generated more precise demand information and
hence more efficient planning by firms. Also, the promise of information ex-
change may have induced firms to join the collusive undertaking who would
9. This idea was first expressed by Stigler (1964). Its most successful formalization is Green
and Porter's (1984).109 The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
have otherwise free ridden on it. In any case, ascertaining the ultimate aims of
the Sugar Institute is not our primary focus here, since the problems ofinstitu-
tional design and evolution are present regardless ofthe ultimate aim.
A potentially very serious problem is that parties to an information-
exchange agreement, whatever its purpose, may wish to misreport their price
or production information.·That is obviously true when the goal is to prevent
price cutting, butit is also true ifthe parties are brought togetherby othergoals.
In the language ofmechanism design, the trade association faces a problem of
Hincentive compatibility." More colloquially, it is a problem of "truth tell-
ing"-will firms be willing to report their true information, given the auditing
and sanctioning technology at the disposal ofthe trade association?
There are two ways in which a firm might violate an information-sharing
arrangement. First, it might simply refuse to report its information. Enforce-
ment against this violation requires some sanction for nonreporting. Second,
the firm might misreport its information. Enforcement against this requires not
only sanction but also detection of the violation, creating a need for auditing
or monitoring offirm activity and/or records.
Surprisingly, and with the exception of reports on undelivered contracts,
which we discuss later, there is no indication of misreporting of statistics by
institute members. There are several reasons why firms might not misreport.
Individuals may be averse to lying for ethical or moral reasons, and thus make
a distinction between the refusal to file a report and falsifying one. Also, it may
be important for individuals and firms to develop a reputation for truth telling,
both in their dealings inside the institute and outside it. Ofcourse, this reputa-
tion is jeopardized only ifthere's a chance that the truth will out. But that was
a risk in this environment, since there were other sources ofinformation, such
as brokers, customers, and the observations ofpurchases ofraw sugar, the key
input. These other sources did not enable outsiders to observe the firm's private
information perfectly, but they may have allowed a sufficiently accurate assess-
ment to deter lying. The possibility of an ex post audit by the institute (al-
though none was ever conducted) would have a been a further deterrent. In
sum, it may be too difficult to construct a credible, systematic lie, since a vari-
ety of bits of information, both internal and external to the firm, have to be
made consistent with any false report.
Another enforcementproblem is how to exclude nonparticipants or violators
from receiving the shared information. If all participants in the agreement re-
ceive the same information from the institute, then there may be an incentive
for a nonparticipant to purchase the information from a cooperative partici-
pant. This in turn would affect the incentives for participation, and in the ex-
treme case the entire agreement would unravel. Vives (1990) addresses this
issue in a setting in which no single firm is large enough to influence aggregate
market outcomes, an assumption not matched in the sugar refining industry.
Nevertheless his results are instructive. Under an exclusionary disclosure rule,
in which only members receive shared information, information sharing is an
equilibrium, provided that the costs ofjoining the trade association are not too110 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
high. Under a nonexclusionary disclosure, in which the information is made
available to nonmembers and the public as well, the free-rider problem pre-
vents information sharing from being an equilibrium.
A more subtle issue is how to ensure credibly the nonsharing ofinformation.
The SugarInstitute aggregated the individual member statistical reports before
distributing that aggregate information to the members and/or the trade. The
central office of the Sugar Institute was more than a simple adding machine,
since it had to assure members that their individual reports would not be shared
with anyone else. A firm might be willing to submit its information to a central
organization yet not want to share that individual information with its competi-
tors. Failure to preserve the confidentiality of this private information could
destroy the information-exchange agreement. Paradoxically, tight controls on
the sharing of information could create more equilibrium sharing of informa-
tion. lo
3.3 Formation ofthe Sugar Institute
3.3.1 Environment and Origins
The U.S. cane sugarrefiners faced serious difficulties in 1927. The combina-
tion ofthe revival ofEuropean beet sugar production after the war, worldwide
government subsidization ofbeet production, and a new "slimness craze" had
left the industry with substantial excess capacity. Although the industry was
still relatively concentrated, with the three largest firms responsible for almost
60 percent ofproduction, this was a far cry from the prewar years, in which a
single firm had dominated the production ofthis homogeneous good. The re-
sult was fierce competition by way of secret price cuts and other concessions
to selected customers, and so falling profit margins.
To a sugar man with a long enough memory, these conditions must have
recalled the situation in the 1880s, when excess capacity was even greater and
price wars prevailed. Then the solution was a grand merger offirms. This first
took the form ofthe SugarTrust, a combination ofeighteen independent firms
representing 80 percent of industry capacity. When in 1891 that form was no
longer legally available, the Sugar Trust became the American Sugar Refining
Company (ASRC).
10. The models ofinformation sharing suggest that the crucial issue is the nature ofthe private
information. Information could be private-valued (like the idiosyncratic costs of an individual
firm), common-valued (like an individual-firm signal of industry demand), or some combination
of the two. If information is completely common-valued, no firm would be willing to pay for the
report of any individual firm, nor would any individual firm care about such a disclosure. With
common-valued information, the aggregate report contains the only useful information; the aggre-
gate statistic is a sufficient statistic. In the presence ofprivate-valued information, however, there
could be concerns about unauthorized disclosure.
Creane (1998) categorizes the previous literature on information sharing and advances a frame-
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Consolidation was the industry's continual response to similar problems
throughout its early history. Over the next twenty years or so, ASRC's strategy
for dealing with entry was to acquire entrants, at times after a fierce price war.
The long-run success of that strategy is subject to dispute-contrast Zerbe's
Chicago school skepticism (1969) of its viability with Eichner's account
(1969), or consult Genesove and Mullin (1997b) for an intermediate view-
point-but the repeated attempts to repeat the success of 1887 are evident.
In part because the buyout attempts were not completely successful, in part
because ofthe loss ofASRC's founder, Henry Havemeyer, in 1907, and in part
due to restrictions imposed by the Department of Justice's 1910 monopoliza-
tion suit, ASRC shrank in size. Its market share had peaked at 91 percent in
1892, and it declined to 43 percent in 1914 (Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade
Journal). The impact ofthis decline on competition, however, was masked by
the government controls implemented for the war and the immediate postwar
period.
By 1927 there were fifteen firms in the industry. Most were located along
the Atlantic seaboard, especially between Boston and Baltimore, and refined
Cuban raw (cane) sugar, although there were a few small refiners in Louisiana
and Texas that refined domestic cane, and two large ones on the West Coast
that refined Hawaiian raw sugar. ASRC was still the largest firm, but with only
a 25 percent market share (and a quarter ownership of the next largest firm,
National). As table 3.1 shows, ASRC and National were the only multiplant
firms, and ASRC the only one to have plants in more than one city. The cane
sugar refining industry accounted for 82.5 percent ofU.S. sugar consumption.
Domestic beet sugar production, concentrated in the Midwest and California,
was responsible for most ofthe remainder (14.4 percent). A small quantity of
sugar was refined "offshore," in the cane-producing islands, and imported into
the United States (2.8 percent). II
The solution of 1887 was unavailable in 1927. The interpretation and en-
forcement ofthe ShermanAct, and its particular application to the sugar indus-
try in the 1910 monopolization suit, had seen to that. Instead, the refiners
formed a trade association, the Sugar Institute. Although preliminary discus-
sions about forming a sugar trade association had taken place as early as 1925,
significant progress was not made until a June 1927 conferral between the at-
torney Wilbur Cummings and the presidents of five refineries-Foster of
ASRC, Lowry ofPennsylvania Sugar, Post of National, Rionda of McCahan,
and Spreckels of Federal Sugar.
I2 After a second meeting, Cummings con-
11. The figures are from United States Temporary National Economic Committee 1941,112.
12. Transcript ofRecord, The Sugar Institute, Inc., v. the United States, Supreme Court of the
United States, October term, 1935, 2:603-4. Although this document was prepared for the appeal
to the Supreme Court, it is the transcript of the district court record. This is a condensed version
of the verbatim testimony from the district court trial. Such narrative statements of evidence are
produced by turning a series ofquestions and answers into a statement by the witness. The Tran-
script of Record documents can be found in the National Archives as part of the district court
record: United States v. Sugar Institute, box 504274A, henceforth cited as District Court Record.112 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
Table 3.1 U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners
Firm
American Sugar Refining Co.






W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining & Molasses Co.
Savannah Sugar Refining Corp.
Revere Sugar Refinery
Imperial Sugar Co.
Federal Sugar Refining (Spreckels Sugar) Co.a
Colonial Sugars Co.




















5 plants: Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, New
Orleans














Sources: United States Temporary National Economic Committee 1941, 112. Plant locations from Palmer
1927, C-33.
apederal Sugar Refining entered receivership and was reorganized as the Spreckels Sugar Company in
1929. The Spreckels company was liquidated in 1930.
ferred with officials ofSecretary Hoover's Commerce Department, the Depart-
ment ofJustice, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) about the proposed
trade association and its activities. By then, the political and legal environment
had become conducive to the formation of trade associations and industry
codes of ethics. William Donovan, who had become the head of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice, was willing to guide firms seeking to
form trade associations that would remain within the law (Hawley 1974, 136).
Donovan indicated that he had no objection to the proposed association, al-
though he warned that such a statement did not foreclose the possibility of
future prosecution. With this tentative approval in place, the five organizing
refiners or "Institute Founders" suggested that Cummings write each of the
otherU.S. cane sugar refiners, outlining a proposed sugar trade association and
inviting them to comment on the proposal and to participate in the organization
ofthis association. 13
This invitation, in turn, led to a meeting of all the U.S. cane sugar refiners
in New York City over 12-16 December 1927. Altnough a representative from
the firm California and Hawaiian (C&H) attended this meeting, that firm had
13. Transcript ofRecord, 2:606-8, DistrictCourt Record, box 504274A. Cummings's 2 Septem-
ber 1927 letter ofinvitation is in the correspondence files ofManuel Rionda y Polledo (Rionda y
Polledo, Papers and Financial Records, subject file W. Cummings, 1921-43).113 The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
already indicated its intention to remain outside the association. 14 The result of
this meeting was crystallized in a proposed industry Code ofEthics, which was
slightly modified after a further consultation with the attorney general's office.
The institute's bylaws and Code ofEthics were adopted at a meeting ofmember
refiners 7 January 1928.
15 Ofthe fifteen U.S. cane sugar refiners, all but C&H
joined in forming the institute.
16
3.3.2 Goals and Structure
Although the industry Code of Ethics (see appendix) was detailed, its first
and underlying principle was that "[a]ll discriminations between customers
should be abolished," and open prices and publicly announced terms should
therefore prevail. For example, the code prohibited quantity discounts to cus-
tomers, so that a large customer such as Kroger or Coca-Cola would have to
pay the same price as a small local grocer. It directly forbade special allow-
ances for customers via rebates or transportation charges.
The code also discouraged practices that, while not discriminatory on their
face, created the opportunity for secret concessions. For example, the code
required that brokers selling refined sugar not be affiliated with any ware-
houses that stored sugar, nor any buyer be affiliated with a public, commercial
warehouse that stored sugar. Combining these activities in the hands ofa single
party gave too large a scope for discrimination between buyers, as a broker
could give a price concession to a buyer by not charging for storage services
rendered.
The institute attempted to limit sales contracts to thirty days as another
mechanism to ensure contractual uniformity and thereby avoid discrimination.
Refined sugar was sold, both before and after the institute, on a system of
price "moves." Any price increase would become effective the day after it was
announced, enabling customers to make purchases at the previous, lowerprice.
Customers would not have to take delivery immediately, but could spread out
withdrawals (deliveries) against these contracts over thirty or more days. For
the thirty-day limit to be effective under the institute, refiners had to "enforce"
their contracts, forcing customers to take delivery.
Information exchange was an express aim ofthe institute's articles ofincor-
poration. 17 Moreover, testimony at trial suggests that the prospects ofobtaining
14. Transcript ofRecord, 2:608, District Court Record, box 504274A.
15. Ibid., 611.
16. This counts Western Sugar Refinery as an original member, although that classification is
uncertain. Frank Sullivan ofWestern testified that his company did not initially join the institute
because of pending discussions about purchase of the Spreckels interests, including Western.
When those discussions fell through, however, Western joined the institute in October]928 (ibid.,
882). However, Sullivan was reported as oneofthe fifteen original directors ofthe institute (Weekly
Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, 12 January 1928, 31), perhaps because Western cooperated in
submitting statistics and received statistical reports even before it joined the institute.
17. Certificate ofincorporation ofthe SugarInstitute, Inc., in Answer ofthe Defendants, United
States ofAmerica, Petitioner, v. The Sugar Institute, etai., Defendants, in the District Court ofthe
United States for the Southern District ofNew York, filed 1August 1931, 66-67.114 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
credible industry information played an important role in the decision ofsome
refiners to join the institute. The testimony ofW. Edward Foster, president of
ASRC and one of the institute's organizers, is typical in this respect: "We ...
were rather cranks on the question ofstatistics. I could not see how any indus-
try could operate successfully without knowing what was going on in the in-
dustry, because we were always moving around in the dark and we thoroughly
believed that ifthe industry itselfknew what was going on in the way ofmelt-
ings [production] and deliveries, and had some knowledge of stocks, that we
would have guiding posts which would enable us to better carryon our busi-
ness}8
The macroeconomic environment, foremost the Great Depression, makes no
appearance in the primary sources' discussions ofthe institute's formation and
operation. This is in part because these sources relate to the early years of the
Sugar Institute, that is, the two years before the stock market crash and the
early, least severe, years of the Depression itself. But, in part, this is also due
to the relatively good performance of the sugar refining industry in the early
stages of the Depression. Compared to total industrial production, which de-
clined 24 percent from December 1929 to December 1930 (Romer 1990), U.S.
sugar consumption in 1930 declined by only 3.6 percent from the previous
year. 19 Such relative stability is consistent with Romer's finding (1990) that the
onset of the Great Depression was associated with much sharper cutbacks in
purchases ofdurables than ofnondurables, seasonally adjusted sales ofwhich
actually rose in the last months of 1929 before decreasing only slightly in early
1930. Sugar is a staple good and, although storable, in purchase decisions is
more like a perishable good. As the macroeconomy continued to tumble over
the next several years, sugar consumption was affected, but less than industrial
production as a whole. The Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal (4 January
1932, 18) remarked that U.S. sugar consumption in 1931 "held up remarkably
well," with a decrease from 1930 ofonly 2 percent. Consumption fell a further
5 percent in 1932, but leveled offin 1933-35.20 The sugar refining firms were
somewhat sheltered from the full effects ofthe Depression because contempo-
raneous economic and political developments broughtlow prices for raw sugar,
the chiefcost component in refined sugar.
21
Any effectofthe Great Depression was probably to strengthen the incentives
offirms to cooperate within the SugarInstitute. First, the reduction ofindustry
demand, and with it the exacerbation of conditions of excess capacity, made
18. Testimony of W. Edward Foster, R. 9206, quoted in Brief for the Defendants on the Facts,
20, District Court Record, box 504270A. .,
19. Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, 15 January 1931, 18,9 January 1930, 18.
20. Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, 11 January 1934, 18. Consumption increased 1
percent in 1933 over 1932, fell 2.6 percent in 1934, and rose 4 percent in 1935.
21. World raw sugar production continued to rise in the 1930s, even as raw sugar prices reached
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competition less profitable and hence cooperation and collusion a more attrac-
tive alternative. Financial difficulties pushed two of the smaller refiners into
receivership, Spreckels in 1930 and Texas Sugar in 1931. Second, information
sharing may have had particular value in the new, more uncertain environment
brought on by the Great Depression. The Depression brought about not only
reduced economic activity, 'but also greater firm and consumer uncertainty.
Thus the knowledge refiners had accumulated from their years ofbusiness ex-
perience had become partially obsolete. As a result, the gain from sharing de-
mand information with competitors was heightened.
Turning from goals to initial structure, the Sugar Institute was organized as
a membership corporation, that is, a corporation composed of and owned by
member firms. The structural details of this organization illustrate the very
decentralized nature ofthe institute. Each member firm was represented on the
institute's board ofdirectors by one, and later two, directors, and institute coun-
sel Wilbur Cummings served as an additional director.22 The board ofdirectors
was authorized to elect a subset ofdirectors to serve as an executive committee,
which operated the day-to-day business affairs of the institute. Geographic
proximity to New York City, where the Sugar Institute was located, ofcourse
favored the East Coast firms. Major decisions were reserved to the board.23
Firms could be elected members ofthe Sugar Institute by a majority vote of
the directors present, along with the payment of an initiation fee of $500.
Members could be expelled for nonpayment of dues or assessments by a ma-
jority vote ofthe directors present. Moreover, members could be expelled "for
any conduct.which, in the opinion of the Board ofDirectors, is prejudicial to
the purposes, principles or interests of the corporation or for any other cause
deemed sufficient by the Board" (By-Laws, 74-75). But expulsion was an un-
likely punishment as it required a vote ofat least two-thirds ofdirectors present
"at a meeting ofthe Board duly called and held for the purpose oftaking such
action" (75). So the institute itself had little punitive power.
The board of directors was authorized to appoint a statistics committee to
"submit to the Board ofDirectors a detailed plan ofreports to be made by the
members to the [Sugar Institute]" (By-Laws, 81). Upon approval ofthe board,
this plan was to be submitted for approval by the members, adoption or any
modification requiring a four-fifths vote. At the December 1927 meeting it was
initially suggested that members be required to submit any reports that the
22. The number of directors was increased to twenty-eight by a vote at the annual meeting of
members on 17 January 1929 (Answer of the Defendants, 79). Place's memo on the 14 March
1929 meeting of the board refers to the election of "additional Directors from each of the mem-
bers." Also, the election for the board in 1930 brought each ofthe then fifteen members two repre-
sentatives (Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, 23 January 1930, 55).
23. The bylaws stipulated that the "Executive Committee shall not be empowered to elect or
expel members, to amend these By-Laws or to change the Code ofEthics" (By-Laws ofthe Sugar
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institute orthe Statistics Committee demanded ofthem. ButArbuckle Brothers
refused,24 and the agreed-upon. rule became that "no plan requiring reports
from members shall be binding upon any member without it shall have been
approved by such member" (81).
As this example illustrates, the institute's institutional design was both cause
and consequence of the institute's problems in attaining its professed goals.
Many of the provisions that weakened the institute were deliberately incor-
porated into the original design. That, in turn, reflected an unwillingness of
(some) refiners to cede discretion to a central industry organization. It is this
unwillingness, coupled with the structural weaknesses, that undermined the
institute's efficacy.
3.3.3 An Initial Assessment
Despite these weaknesses, however, the industry did come to exchange in-
formation previously unavailable to the refiners. This included weekly total
meltings (production), total stocks on hand, and total deliveries. In addition,
information as to deliveries and stocks by state were distributed weekly and
monthly. The institute's statistical services were a point ofpride in the refiners'
defense at trial, and the Defendants' Fact Brief devotes a section to it. These
particular defense claims are supported both by the public record and the pri-
vate accounts ofPlace.
The refiners claimed that this information "collected by the Institute could
not have been obtained by the trade through any other source." 25 This claim is
somewhat exaggerated. Accurate raw sugar imports were available from the
Customs House, and the premier trade publication of the period, the Weekly
Statistical Sugar Trade Journal (see fig. 3.1), had been reporting them for
years. However, although there were no uses for raw sugar other than refined
sugar, at high frequencies these figures could be used only to guess the aggre-
gate level ofproduction given the variable length oftime for which raw sugar
was stored. The journal did report production at the regional level, but, again,
at high frequencies the reported figures were in part estimates; the journal's
publisher and chief statistician testified that he received reports from the refin-
ers "[w]eekly, monthly, semi-annually or, at least, yearly." The journal also
published figures on deliveries, although only Western and C&H actually re-
ported theirs. The deliveries of the other refiners were estimated on the basis
of their production and estimates of their refined sugar stocks.26 The journal
published no information on the location or level of consignment stocks, or
state-level sales. Thus, trade statistics were available before the Sugar Institute,
but they were inaccurate, especially at high frequencies and the farther down-
stream the stage ofactivity.
24. Testimony of Goetzinger, in Transcript of Record, 2:680, District Court Record, box
504274A.
25. Defendants' Fact Brief, 69, District Court Record, box 504274A.
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The institute's provision of state-level data may have been ofgreatest value
to the firms. Prior to the Sugar Institute, individual refiners knew little beyond
their own figures about the consumption and distribution of sugar in specific
portions of the country. Because each operated only in particular geographic
markets, this information was much more important than national aggregates.
Campiglia ofC&H testified that "the distribution by States ... gave us a com-
parison with distribution offormer years by States, and it gave us the quantity
of stock of raw sugars and refined sugars on hand; and permitted us to deter-
mine whether stocks were piling up and accumulating or moving out freely to
the trade; and many things which we considered valuable to us." 27
The institute achieved only temporary success in exchanging sales statistics.
In light of the consensus to report meltings and deliveries, what additional
information would sales statistics provide? Most sugar was sold on one ofthe
price "moves." With the knowledge of a firm's meltings and deliveries in the
aftermath of a move, one could eventually estimate its sales. However, recall
that the reported weekly deliveries and meltings were aggregated before being
distributed to institute members. In the aftermath ofa price move, these figures
would help refiners estimate total sales, but not the sales ofany individual re-
finer.
Aggregate sales statistics would therefore provide more immediate informa-
tion on the level of demand. Individual sales statistics could help indicate
whether a given refiner was offering secret concessions. Assuming truthful re-
porting, ifa refiner obtained unusually large sales on a given price movement,
its rivals might infer that it had offered a secret concession. In practice, the
refiners agreed to circulate aggregate sales statistics, and then only temporarily.
3.4 Evolution: Inducing Information Exchange
We are faced with a puzzle. Ifthe Sugar Institute was such a weak organiza-
tion, lacking much central authority, how was it able to attain any ofits goals?
At an initial reading, the provision that no report would be mandatory upon a
member unless approved by that member would seem to guarantee that the
Sugar Institute would effect no improvement in information exchange. But the
organization ofthe institute, along with this provision, created a framework in
which members could debate and bargain over what reports would be binding.
In this section we examine the learning process, and analyze the factors con-
tributing to the institute's successes and failures in overcoming the incentive
problems involved in organizing information exchange.
3.4.1 Agreeing on Shared Statistics
Arbuckle Brothers objected to the original demand that the Statistics Com-
mittee have a claim on all statistics because the claim was unspecified. "I stated
27. Quoted in Defendants' Fact Brief, 19-20, District Court Record.119 The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
that we would not agree in advance to give anybody all the information they
asked for concerning our business," its representative at the early meeting later
testified. It is entirely reasonable that firms would not want to surrender control
over their proprietary information on an ex ante, carte-blanche basis. At this
initial stage of organizing the Sugar Institute, potential members could not
possibly anticipate what information might be sought in the future. But that
concern need nottranslate into a resistance to all information exchange. Rather,
the adopted provision allowed firms to determine what information would be
required, after the agreement was signed. Thus was the legitimate fear of an
overly inquisitive Sugar Institute structurally allayed. This ex post veto gave
each firm a bargaining chip in the ex post negotiation over what information
was to be required.
Since reporting was not mandatory, attempts were made to induce "volun-
tary" reporting ofstatistics, especially sales statistics. One approach was to use
the Sugar Institute as a forum for moral suasion, or as a "bully pulpit." This
was an initial tack taken by Judge Ballou, executive secretary of the Sugar
Institute. Ballou repeatedly emphasized the collective and, by implication, in-
dividual interest in having sales statistics available. At the 14 March 1929
meeting of the directors, Ballou indicated that C&H suspected that it had re-
ceived inferior sales volume on the previous buying movement because ofthe
failure of eastern refiners to enforce the thirty-day limit on contracts. Rolph
of C&H further indicated his intention to "investigate upon his return to San
Francisco the amount of sugar that they sold in various parts of the country
and if he arrives at the conclusion that the C. & H. proportion of sales were
smaller than the share to which they were entitled he indicates that it will be
his intention to break the price to the 4.75 cents basis again. Judge Ballou
seized upon this opportunity to again express to all refiners present the desir-
ability of having statistics on sales available for the Institute. Such statistics
would make it impossible for anyone to arrive at an imaginary grievance re-
garding the amount ofsugar sold by anyone refiner." 28
Ballou's statementis noteworthy for several reasons. First, exchange ofsales
28. Place Memoranda, Board of Directors meeting, 14 March 1929. Taken out ofcontext, one
might view Rolph's reference to the market "share to which they were entitled" as an indication
that the Sugar Institute was administering an explicit price-fixing or market-allocation agreement.
But the entire private and public record strongly indicates otherwise. Certainly, individual mem-
bers at times spoke, almost wistfully, about using production quotas, but such matters were never
acted upon. Typical is the following entry in Place: "Mr. Babst submitted a formula for the self-
regulation of meltings of individual refiners. He suggested that proper percentages of total melt
must be arrived at by individual refiners taking the capacities of all refiners reported to the U.S.
Government during War-time 'control' plus 50% ofany subsequent increase in capacity.... This
question of 'self-regulation' was discussed at great length but no decision was arrived at. No one
expressed any opinion regarding Mr. Babst's proposed formula (11 April 1929, I). Almost a year
later, Bartlett complained "that, in spite of all the pretty speeches which have been made on this
subject, there is no evidence of this principle being put into practice. Mr. Foster replied that,
unfortunately, the Institute's attorney does not allow discussion of this subject on a basis which
could bring actual results" (6 February 1930, 1).120 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
information was linked to contract enforcement and homogeneity of contrac-
tual terms, at least in C&H's mind. Second, Ballou suggests that information
exchange was meant, in part, to avoid price wars that would otherwise be trig-
gered by outside factors, such as shocks to industry demand. Third, he tried to
show why it was in the individual interest of firms to supply this information.
Ifthe absence ofcomplete sales information triggered a price war, all firms in
the industry would be harmed, including those that had chosen to keep their
sales statistics private.
Moral suasion was insufficient, at least for some refiners. At this same meet-
ing'ASRC's Foster "very emphatically stated that in his opinion it was no one's
business how much business [ASRC] or any other refiner booked on anyone
buying movement. He stated that [ASRC] would refuse to give any statistics
on sales. This had been the position of [ASRC] from the very start." ASRC
was the largest ofall the cane refiners, with a market share ofabout 25 percent.
Its sales statistics would therefore be very informative about industry-wide
fluctuations. This indicates the seriousness ofASRC's refusal to provide statis-
tics, and suggests a possible source of that refusal-ASRC may have been
large enough to infer industry trends on its own. Moreover, ASRC operated
several plants and was active in a number of markets throughout the country,
which may also have given ASRC a greater ability to assess market trends
independently. ASRC's nonreporting led other firms to do the same. National,
Pennsylvania, and Federal, respectively the second, third, and eleventh largest
members of the institute, stopped reporting sales.29 This suggests a domino
effect ordered by firm size, since the largest firm reporting its sales may pro-
vide more information than it receives in return. Of course, this does not ac-
count for why the smaller Federal halted its reports.
With information exchange breaking down, the Sugar Institute switched to
an exclusionary disclosure rule. In the 28 March 1929 meeting, Ballou "re-
ported that he had issued (only to those refiners who were reporting sales)
some interesting statistics regarding the last buying movement. He is to follow
this up with further statistics regarding the rate of withdrawal of these con-
tracts. Any refiner not now receiving these statistics can secure them by re-
porting his own sales records.30
Place advocated a more radical change. In early April 1929 a memo that he
authored was presented by McCahan's president at a special Institute Founders'
meeting. The memo, which framed a sizable portion ofthe meeting's agenda,
characterizes the early structure of the institute as suffering from nearly fatal
flaws. "The conception (generally), the discussion, the wording, the approval
or the rejection, and finally, the enforcement ofthe Institute's 'resolutions' are
all dictated, not by an impartial, well-considered and comprehensive plan for
the benefit ofthe Industry as a whole, but by the self-interest ofthe individual
29. Place Memoranda, Board ofDirectors meeting, 14 March 1929, C&H, the third largest firm
in the industry, was not a member ofthe institute at this time.
30. Place Memoranda, Executive Committee meeting, 28 March 1929.121 The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
members on each separate issue. This fundamental defect in the Institute's or-
ganization has manifested itself in numerous issues," including the provision
of statistics. On this issue "[d]ifferent members have arbitrarily assumed the
right to refuse to furnish to the Institute any statistics which they, individually,
do not care to reveal, irrespective of whether or not the Institute believes such
statistics to be important in preventing serious misunderstandings." After sur-
veying other problems attributed to the Sugar Institute's decentralized struc-
ture, the memo proposes "delegating positive power to some central authority,"
specifically an executive officer with binding authority.
The assembled Institute Founders referred the issue to the Statistics Com-
mittee to decide on the statistics required. The decision ofthat committee was
"to be binding on all members." Nevertheless, no additional penalties were
authorized for noncompliance with requests for statistics. At the 2 May 1929
directors' meeting, considerable discussion about enforcement resulted in the
creation of an Enforcement Committee "with the power to issue regulations
for the enforcement of the resolution passed today and with the authority to
pass judgment on any disputed case involving brokers, warehousemen or mer-
chants." This did not mark the end ofthe institute's enforcement problems, but
it did set up a more explicit institutional structure for addressing those issues.
By August 1929 at the latest the Enforcement Committee was successfully
requesting refiner reports on undelivered contracts to assist in contract en-
forcement. 31
Compliance with the request for statistics increased thereafter, although it
was not accomplished immediately or uniformly. But as we have noted, the
refiners came to agree to furnish weekly reports on meltings, deliveries, total
stocks, and deliveries by state.
Despite these areas of agreement, there was still the highly sensitive issue
ofsharing ofsales statistics. The major objections against furnishing sales sta-
tistics came from ASRC, National, andArbuckle Brothers (United States Tem-
porary National Economic Committee 1941, 121). These were the first, sec-
ond, and fifth largest firms in the industry, and so they may have felt that their
individual sales statistics were sufficiently informative that sharing these num-
bers would not be a fair trade. Another laggard in providing sales statistics
was Colonial, one ofthe smallest refiners but also one accused ofengaging in
unethical practices during the institute.32 Colonial's refusal was probably an
attempt to hide its violations, however much its refusal might have been tanta-
mount to an admission ofguilt.
Since the institute was unable to make sales statistics mandatory, it reverted
31. Place Memoranda, Enforcement Committee meetings, 8 August 1929, 22 August 1929,
Place was placed on the Enforcement Committee only on I August 1929, which therefore marks
the beginning ofhis memoranda on the Enforcement Committee. It is possible that refiner reports
to the Enforcement Committee on undelivered contracts might have been occurring for several
months previously.
32. Colonial eventually acknowledged some of these violations (Place Memoranda, Enforce-
ment Committee meeting, 3 October 1929.122 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
to use of an exclusionary disclosure rule; only those members making sales
reports would receive sales statistics. This tactic was successful for a time in
encouraging some participation, but it ultimately unraveled. C&H, which had
become a member of the institute in September 1929, stopped reporting its
sales statistics in February 1930, because five other refiners were not re-
porting.33 Although not identified, these firms presumably includedASRC, Ar-
buckle Brothers, and National, whose opposition to supplying sales statistics
was unconditional. Ifso, then C&H would have been the largest firm supplying
sales statistics before halting its cooperation. C&H may have felt that coopera-
tion on those terms was an unfair trade, since it was providing a relatively
precise signal of West Coast demand in exchange for a relatively imprecise
indication ofEastCoast demand. This precipitated a renewed discussion by the
institute board. ASRC, Arbuckle Brothers, and National declared themselves
"unalterably opposed" to reporting sales. Colonial, Spreckels, C&H, and
McCahan refused to make sales reports unless all did. It was decided that "[t]he
other eight refiners are to continue to make [these] reports and, in turn, they
(and only they) will receive from the Institute a report on the total 'Sales'...
made by the eight refiners involved."34 But the handwriting was on the wall,
and two months later, by which time only Savannah, Henderson, Imperial, and
Texas, all southern refiners, were reporting sales, the collection ofsales statis-
tics was abandoned.35 As the numberofcooperating firms declined, the "aggre-
gate" sales statistics became less informative about general market trends and
more revealing about the business patterns ofthe cooperating firms, informa-
tion that those firms might wish to remain private.
So while the attempts to exchange data on meltings and deliveries were suc-
cessful, the attempt to exchange sales information was ultimately not. Interest-
ingly, although the Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal had been reporting
weekly (estimated) meltings and deliveries since the 1880s (indeed, the credi-
bility ofthese published statistics may be supported by the journal's longevity),
the journal never published sales statistics. One interpretation ofthe difference
between meltings/deliveries and sales is that the former statistics were nearly
common knowledge without the institute, and the institute exchange merely
made the public information more accurate. As noted earlier, independent in-
formation was available on those series from raw sugarpurchases. On the other
hand, perhaps that information (in part provided to the journal by the refiners
themselves) was more publicly available precisely because it was less sensitive
than sales information.
Since it was the larger firms that were the most reluctant to provide sales
statistics, why did the larger firms participate at all? They participated because
of their interest in facilitating collusion. A firm that does not intend to cheat
on the collusive understanding has an incentive to share credibly its own infor-
33. Place Memoranda, Board ofDirectors meeting, 14 February 1930.
34. Ibid., 13 March 1930.
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mation, since that establishes to other firms in the industry that, in fact, it did
not cheat. The alternative to information exchange might have been either con-
tinued cutthroat competition or intermittently successful collusion, with ad-
verse industry-wide demand shocks resulting in periodic price wars. The larger
firms, precisely because they controlled a greater share ofindustry output, had
alargerincentive to make collusion workable than did the smallerfirms. Butthe
larger firms may have thought that shared meltings and delivery information
would be sufficient to detect and absolve cheating, and that individual sales
statistics would reveal too much about an individual refiner's business strategy.
Moreover, even if collusion motivated the formation of the Sugar Institute,
it need not have embraced all the firms in the industry. In particular, the five
Institute Founders may have organized the institute with an eye toward moni-
toring the fringe competitors. They might have doubted these fringe firms'
willingness to stick with a collusive agreement, or they might have had un-
certainty over these firms' supply functions. Under this view, the institute at-
tempted to gather and disseminate aggregate industry statistics so that the
larger firms could subtract out their own figures and thereby infer the supply
(functions) ofthe fringe. This knowledge could then be used in future pricing
decisions, much the same way as a dominant firm would set a price anticipating
the supply response of the competitive fringe. Conversely, the promise of de-
mand information, more valuable to the small than to the large firm, may have
been the carrot that induced the small firms to participate. Unfortunately, we
have uncovered no narrative evidence in support ofeither interpretation.
3.4.2 Audits and Investigations
Auditing and direct investigation ofrefiner or affiliated businesses' records
provided another source ofshared information. These were intended to enforce
the Code of Ethics, rather than facilitate information exchange narrowly con-
strued. There is no indication of any audit of a refiner report concerning its
own meltings, deliveries, or sales, although refiner consignment stocks were
audited.
The Enforcement Committee investigated and ruled' on affiliations between
brokers and warehouses, and between customers and warehouses. To that end,
it was authorized on 9 May 1929 to retain investigators' firms to follow up on
complaints, and it subsequently retained the firms Proudfoot-Chinal and the
Bishop Agency. Although the authorization for these investigations nominally
concerned only the separation ofbrokerage and storage activities, the implicit
scope was much broader. At the 29 May 1929 meeting of the institute board,
Colonial indicated "that refiners should be willing to throw their books open
for the investigation of any violation of the Code of Ethics." Other firms
agreed, although they found no need to adopt a resolution "because no refiner
had ever failed to supply full information on any subject requiring investi-
gation."36
36. Place Memoranda, Board ofDirectors meeting, 29 May 1929.124 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
Investigations of brokers and warehouses proceeded, many times without
incident. But conflicts sometimes arose when a buyer or broker who had a
close relationship with a single refiner was involved. When an investigation by
an institute employee, Patterson, revealed that the Webster Grocery Company
was affiliated with warehouses, Godchaux, which supplied Webster, objected
to the findings, and the Enforcement Committee agreed to a new investigation
by Proudfoot-Chinal.~n When shortly thereafter the institute board authorized
an investigation of warehouses and it was suggested that Patterson conduct it,
the Godchaux representative "stated very emphatically that he ... will not
allow Mr. Patterson to enter the Godchaux offices again as he considers him
inefficient, biased, and liable to make unsupported accusations." 38 Other board
members spoke in Patterson's defense, but it was decided that the investigation
of warehouses throughout the nation required a national agency, and so an
outside firm was retained instead.39
These episodes suggestthe hazards the institute faced in choosing its investi-
gators and auditors. The institute typically decided upon an outside firm, rather
than rely on member refiners themselves or use an institute employee. As the
Patterson example illustrates, the neutrality of an institute employee might be
challenged and thereby undermine the employee's effectiveness in other tasks.
Retaining outside firms was costly in its own way. For example, the auditing
firm of Haskins and Sells, retained to audit the stocks refiners were storing in
consignment markets, acknowledged at the outset that it did not have experi-
ence conducting that type of audit.40 The refiners themselves had employees
with the requisite experience, but they were not used by the institute, presum-
ably because their independence would be in doubt.
41
The level of consignment stocks was the only area in which refiners them-
selves were audited. There is a single recorded incident in which a refiner with-
drew its permission for such an audit. Godchaux refused permission on the
grounds that its original agreement "was given with the provision that Colonial
also submit to a similar audit. [But since] the Institute lacks knowledge of the
warehouses in which Colonial is storing, this proviso has not been lived up
to." 42 Though a single incident, this points up a weakness in the blanket autho-
rization for the institute to conduct audits, namely, that the authorization was
not binding. Just as firms were required to file statistical reports yet could fail
37. Place Memoranda, Enforcement Committee meeting, 15 August 1929.
38. Ibid., 12 September 1929.
39. Proudfoot-Chinal was too small a firm to undertake this investigation.
40. Place Memoranda, Board of Directors meeting, 28 Febr\lary 1929.
41. Williamson's discussion (1975) of the auditing capabilities of a firm may be relevant here.
He argues that an audit conducted by an internal agent, such as a representative of the general
office, will be more successful than an outside audit. In addition to the greater legal rights that an
internal auditor will possess, the internal auditor will receive greater cooperation from the audited
unit. Similar cooperation with an outside auditor could be viewed as disloyal. In this setting, how-
ever, the need for independence and neutrality was paramount.
42. Place Memoranda, Executive Committee meeting, 7 November 1929.125 The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
to file a report in any given week, firms could be required to open their books
to the institute yet rescind that authorization in any particular case. These is-
sues are intimately connected with the hybrid organizational design of the
Sugar Institute. Just as a firm retains residual control over its information, it
controls the residual right to refuse an audit by an outside agency. Even under
the institute, that right was 'retained by the individual firms, and was waived
only on a case-by-case basis.
3.4.3 Confidentiality
The Sugar Institute revealed less information to its members than it knew. It
received the complete vector of reports from its members, but in most cases
aggregated it before distributing it to them. In this, the institute may have been
steering its way between the 1921 and 1925 Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussed in the introduction. On the other hand, aggregation may have been a
requirement of incentive compatibility. A firm might not want to reveal to its
competitors its own information, but might be willing to reveal that to a third
party who would aggregate it first. Either reason supports the need for an inter-
mediary.
The incentive-compatibility reason also suggests the importance ofthe pro-
cedures that an intermediary adopts to ensure confidentiality. Clearly, this was
a concern of refiners. The institute reporting system was designed to protect
confidentiality. Individual member reports were received by the institute staff,
and a letter code assigned each refiner. The individual statistics were then
transferred onto standard institute forms identified by code letter, withoutrefer-
ence to the refiner's name.43 Clearly, these efforts depended upon the integrity
ofthe institute staff. There is no indication ofany leakage ofindividual refiner
reports. An aggregate, annual report ofSugarInstitute statistics did find its way
into the hands ofan economics professor, and members were sufficiently upset
to bring the matter to the Executive Committee.44 The importance ofthe staff
was highlighted after the district court decision against the Sugar Institute.
Several refiners spoke ofreplacing the Sugar Institute with a newly organized
united sugar association, which would gather, aggregate, and disseminate sta-
tistics on past prices and terms under the legal restrictions imposed by the
court. An unsigned memorandum advancing this proposal noted, "Naturally,
the integrity ofthe Association staffmust be above suspicion so that no mem-
ber need fear that the intimate details ofhis business shall be divulged." 45
43. Minutes ofthe Executive Committee meeting, 30 November 1936, in Place, W. 1. McCahan
Sugar Refining and Molasses Company, Sugar Institute: Reorganization and Closing, subject
group 3, box II.
44. Place Memoranda, Executive Committee meeting, 7 November 1929.
45. Although unsigned, it is likely that the memorandum was drafted by Louis Place and/or
William Tyler ofC&H (Place, Sugar Institute: Reorganization and Closing).126 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
3.4.4 Contract Enforcement and Misreporting
Statistical exchange advanced adherence to the Code ofEthics, as exempli-
fied by the enforcementofdelivery on thirty-day contracts.46 Recall that refined
sugar was purchased on a price move, and that the customer thereby purchased
the right to take delivery gradually over the following period, which prior to
the institute was thirty days or more. The Institute tried to restrict contracts
to exactly thirty days, and in order to monitor compliance, the Enforcement
Committee requested and received reports from refiners.
A standard contract stipulated only the quantity ofsugar and the basis price,
the price for standard granulated. Details such as the grades of sugar the cus-
tomer wished to receive did not have to be specified until shortly before deliv-
ery.47 If a customer had not yet furnished these instructions, that contract re-
mained unspecified. All unspecified or undelivered contracts were supposed to
be reported to the institute for each price move. These reports were not aggre-
gated across refiners before dissemination. These figures were of interest as
the contract due date approached since a firm carrying a large balance ofunde-
livered or unspecified contracts was unlikely to meet the due date, either be-
cause of capacity constraints in production or transportation, or because the
high balances signaled an unwillingness to pressure customers to take delivery.
This information allowed other refiners to adjust their contract enforcement,
and threaten to do so. This in turn could provide incentives for the uncoopera-
tive refiner to strengthen its own contract-enforcement efforts.
In most instances, this information was reported accurately. Some firms ini-
tially refused to supply contract figures, but this was met successfully by the
actual and threatened retaliation ofnonreporting by other firms. In a few other
instances irregularities in reported numbers arose, apparently due to sincere
misunderstandings as to how contracts should be classified.48
There appears to have been only a single case of intentional misreporting.
Before a meeting of the Enforcement Committee in January 1930, National's
representative confided to Place and an institute staff member that he had
definite evidence that other refiners had "failed to receive specifications for
some contracts which they have reported to the Enforcement Committee as
being specified." Consequently, National would refuse to continue reporting
contract-enforcement figures, and would not undertake to force deliveries.
Place responded that he had heard similar rumors and so he "thought a 'show-
down' was necessary."49
46. The institute gathered other statistics that played a role incode compliance. These were "the
amount ofsugar on consignment by states (weekly), the amount ofsugar stored in transit by states
(weekly) and the amount of sugar moved by eastern and southern differential routes for refiners'
account and for customers' account. This information (being of little or no interest to the trade
generally) was ordinarily sent only to members and to the importers" (Defendants' Fact Brief,
69-70, District Court Record).
47. An example ofa grade is powdered sugar, which results from crushing granulated sugar.
48. Place Memoranda, Enforcement Committee meeting, 9 January 1930.
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When the meeting opened, the representatives ofASRC and Spreckels ad-
mitted that they had large balances ofundelivered contracts with A&P, a major
sugar customer. In both cases, they had received "dummy" instructions from
A&P, meant to be canceled later, but they had classified these contracts as
"specified" for institute reporting purposes. National had received and refused
similar instructions from A&P, and had therefore classified its A&P contracts
as unspecified. National repeated its intention to withhold contract-enforce-
ment figures. 5o Nevertheless, the next week National agreed to return to sup-
plying contract-enforcement figures on the understanding that all refiners
would make "honest" reports.
51
Although this is a case where misreporting occurred, it illustrates the factors
that prevented it from completely undermining the agreement. First, informa-
tion was available from other sources to detect possible misreporting, and this
information was sufficiently credible to be used as a basis for retaliation. Sec-
ond, retaliatory nonreporting was apparently sufficient to deter additional
problems. Finally, the detail that Place accords this incident suggests that mis-
reporting was rare.
3.4.5 Participation: Members and Nonmembers
The Sugar Institute did not encompass all sugarproducers, nor even all cane
sugar refiners. Both technological and geographic differences limited the asso-
ciation's expanse. The largest California refiner was not initially a member of
the institute. Offshore refiners always remained outside the institute. And beet
sugar producers were organized in a separate trade association, the Domestic
Sugar Bureau. Even among members themselves, there were important geo-
graphic differences. Refiners differed in the cost of shipping their sugars to
consumption centers. The distance and the transportation mode (rail versus
water) varied by the refiners' location. Nevertheless, over time, the institute
acknowledged and accommodated these heterogeneous interests, if not
through membership, then through cooperation.
C&H was the third largest U.S. cane sugarrefiner, and the largest in Califor-
nia. Its primary marketing area was the western states, although it did compete
directly with New Orleans and East Coast refiners for sales in the Midwest,
including Chicago. The West was the center ofthe beet sugar industry, and so
C&H's main competition came from there. While the SugarInstitute was being
formed, similar discussions were being held among beet and Louisiana cane
firms about forming the Domestic Sugar Bureau. These groups considered
their interests to be opposed to those ofthe cane sugar refiners, and so to foster
good relations with its beet sugar rivals, C&H initially chose to join their asso-
ciation and remain outside the other (United States Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee 1941, 115-16). Moreover, President Rolph of C&H, who
desired a single trade association encompassing all sugar producers, thought
50. Ibid.
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that remaining outside the institute gave him the opportunity to persuade beet
sugar interests ofthe desirability ofunion.52 IfC&H failed to merge the associ-
ations within two years, Rolph intended to apply for institute membership.
To the eastern refiners C&H was the scourge of the industry. Rudolph
Spreckels testified at tariff hearings in June 1929 that while "C&H has not
alway precipitated the cut in refined ... I have found their fine Italian hand
back ofevery refiner's cut that has been made." 53 The eastern refiners' private
assessments were no kinder.54 Underlying this eastern pique was a genuine
divergence of interests born of geography. Since Hawaiian raw sugar faced a
lower tariff than Cuban, C&H's refining costs were lower than the eastern re-
finers. On the other hand, in the Midwest, where C&H and the eastern refiners
actively competed, the latter were advantaged by the shorter distance to the
East Coast and the cheap water transportation over the Great Lakes. C&H's
absorption of this freight cost differential reduced the prices eastern refiners
could command not only in the Midwest, but also within their own territories,
because they could not completely price discriminate between the two regions.
These differences, particularly C&H's need to absorb transportation costs,
were at the heart of the C&H participation issue. Differences in costs across
refiners made collusion more difficult to achieve.
Despite these differences, there were also shared interests, which helps ac-
counts for the consultation between C&H and the institute. That Ballou had
formerly served as C&H's counsel aided this interaction. Nevertheless, there
were limits to what could be accomplished while C&H remained a nonmem-
ber, and by September 1929, C&H was prepared to join the Sugar Institute.
Having concluded that a merger ofthe beet sugar and cane sugar trade associa-
tions was not imminent, Rolph carried out his initial plan to join the institute
roughly two years after its formation. Nevertheless, C&H insisted on retaining
its membership in the Domestic Sugar Bureau. Its application for Sugar Insti-
tute membership included the proviso that in any situation in which institute
requirements conflicted with those of the bureau, the C&H would not be re-
sponsible for adhering to the institute requirement.55 This term was accepted.
There were not many conflicts between the two associations' requirements, yet
this was still a considerable concession by the Sugar Institute. The willingness
ofincumbent members to accept a separate set ofrules for C&H indicates that
they had decided to address the differences with C&H within the institute
rather than outside it. For C&H, membership gave a voice and vote in shaping
ongoing institute resolutions; each had value precisely because the SugarInsti-
tute was an evolving, learning organization. Correspondingly, the institute pre-
ferred C&H as a memberbecause that made enforcing adherence to resolutions
easier. Moreover, membership facilitated communication among refiners.
52. Place Memoranda, Executive Committee meeting, 19 September 1929.
53. Spreckels testimony, U.S. Senate 1929, 167.
54. Place Memoranda, Executive Committee meeting, 8 March 1929.
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The Sugar Institute did not absorb all relevant interests under its tent. One
example was Hershey, an "offshore" refiner operating in Cuba. Although a
nonmember, Hershey intermittently supplied statistics on contract enforce-
ment.56 When C&H joined the institute, Ballou suggested that eventually the
institute might extend Hershey at least associate membership.57 Later, a group
ofsouthern refiners proposed that the institute either force Hershey to discon-
tinue its "unethical" business practices in Florida or invite it to join the in-
stitute. But Spreckels and C&H, who, unlike the southern refiners, did not
compete with the offshore refiners, objected to extending cooperation to
membership, because offshore and domestic refiners had diametrically op-
posed interests on the tariffon imported refined sugar. It was felt that member-
ship for Hershey might undermine the institute's efforts to lobby for a higher
refined tariff.58
Tariff matters also played a role in keeping the beet sugar producers and the
cane sugar refiners apart. As documented in Ellison and Mullin (1995), the
domestic cane sugar refiners wanted a high tariff on refined sugar and a low
tariff on their input, raw (cane) sugar. The beet sugar manufacturers, on the
other hand, wanted a high tariffon imported raw cane sugar, the essential input
of a near perfect substitute. Moreover, beet sugar was produced by dozens of
small, price-taking firms (the price of sugar in western states equaled the San
Francisco base price plus freight from San Francisco, where the West Coast
cane sugar refiners were located). As a result, no individual firm had the incen-
tive to join the institute. If the institute advanced collusion, each beet firm
would prefer to free ride on the higher price.
Nevertheless, there were common interests among all sugar producers, and
these were advanced through consultation between the respective trade associ-
ations.59 The institute and the Domestic Sugar Bureau exchanged figures on
the deliveries of all sugar, cane sugar, and beet sugar, by state, on a monthly
basis.
60 Since beet sugar accounted for over 14 percent of U.S. consumption,
such information was essential for estimating demand at both the national
and regional level. Since each cane refiner had particular territories, the re-
gional decompositions were particularly valuable. A second, less benign use
would be for a division of markets between the beet and cane interests,
56. Place Memoranda, Executive Committee meeting, 24 October 1929, indicates that Hershey
was supplying its figures on undelivered contracts through its broker, Pike, and that Pike was
requesting that the institute reciprocate. Hershey statistics on undelivered contracts are reported
in the next week.
57. Ibid., 19 September 1929.
58. Place Memoranda, Board ofDirectors meeting, 24 July 1930.
59. The Domestic Sugar Bureau had its own concerns in terms of securing membership and
adherence, which is beyond the scope of this paper. "The Bureau represented 80 to 90 percent
oftotal beet sugar production and about 30 percent ofLouisiana cane production. Although none
of the beet companies east ofChicago was included in the membership, the only important non-
member was the Michigan Sugar Co." (United States Temporary National Economic Committee
1941,116).
60. Defendants' Fact Brief, 70, District Court Record.130 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
although there is no indication that a formal or informal division of markets
ever took place.61
3.5 After the Sugar Institute
The half decade that followed the spring of 1930, when the Place minutes
trail off, saw a constantly changing legal environment for the refiners. In the
spring ofthe next year, the Department ofJustice filed suit. 1933 saw the pas-
sage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA), both ofwhich held out the promise not only ofgovern-
ment relaxation of antitrust restrictions on industry association activities but,
initially, ofgovernment enforcement ofthose actions as well. In 1934 the gov-
ernment passed the SugarAct, which established quotas on the importation of
raw sugar and the production ofbeet sugar and marked the beginning ofcon-
tinuous government involvement in the industry. Though not directly collusive,
this act did protect domestic refiners from entry in the form ofoffshore refiners
and beet producers. But two months later the District Court found against the
refiners in the SugarInstitute case. Around this time, the refiners became aware
that the government would not enforce the AAA or NIRA codes. The begin-
ning ofthe end ofthe New Deal experiment in corporatist economics came in
the 1935 Schechter decision, which declared the NIRA unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court annulled the AAA as unconstitutional in January 1936, shortly
before issuing its verdict in the Sugar Institute case.
Several times during this period, the SugarInstitute tried to reinvent itself-
first as a code offair competition under the AAA, then as an all-encompassing
sugar-producer association, and finally as a revised institute that would be in
compliance with the Supreme Court decision, before abandoning any attempt
at a trade association in November 1936. Although none of these plans ever
came to fruition, they nonetheless reflect what refiners learned from the Sugar
Institute experience, and how they responded to the changed legal environ-
ment.
The refiners' first response to the New Deal legislation was to move to dis-
miss their case. The motion was rejected; nonetheless, the district court deci-
sion did stipulate that the decrees could be modified ifthe refiners so requested
under the NIRA.62 In the meantime, the refiners had submitted a code of fair
competition under the AAA in August 1933.63 Like many other such codes,
61. At one institute Executive Committee meeting, the repr~sentative from the Domestic Sugar
Bureaudisplayed a map he intended to circulate showing apotential division ofmarkets. Neverthe-
less, the plans for circulating this map were quickly abandoned (Place Memoranda, Executive
Committee meeting, 8 March 1929, 16 May 1929).
62. United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 Fed. Sup. 910 (1934).
63. The proposed code is reproduced in Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, 10-31 August
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it called upon the secretary of agriculture to restrain new entry and capacity
expansion, to allocate production directly ifnecessary, and to license all mem-
bers ofthe industry.64 It conferred upon the refiners the right "to confer among
themselves" to halt ruinous price cutting, and its article 3, "Unfair Competi-
tion," condemned the same practices as the Sugar Institute's Code ofEthics.
The organizational structure envisioned in the AAA code differed signifi-
cantly from that of the Sugar Institute. The "one refiner, one vote" system of
the institute was supplemented by an additional requirement that gave larger
refiners a greater voice. Changes to the AAA code would require approval of
not only a majority ofdirectors, butalso the assent ofrefiners with a combined
market share ofat least two-thirds.65
This strengthening of the voting powers of the larger firms was accom-
plished in the face ofthe ability ofsmall refiners to block the agreement itself,
for the refiners had been informed that the secretary of agriculture would ac-
ceptonly a unanimous agreement.66 In contrast, individual refiners had no such
veto over the formation of the Sugar Institute; indeed, as we have shown, not
all relevant sugar producers were at all times members of that association.
Evidently, experience under the Sugar Institute had taught refiners that it was
important that the larger firms have greater formal voting rights in industry de-
liberations.
This outcome stands in sharp contrastto thatofmany otherindustries. Brand
(1988) has emphasized that the political power ofsmall firms led industries to
approve codes that were disadvantageous to the larger firms and so unsustain-
able without government enforcement. Alexander (1997) illustrates this pro-
cess for the macaroni industry, whose code was crafted to appeal to the major-
ity ofsmaller, less efficient firms. When the government then failed to enforce
the industry codes, the industry's attempts at collusion were undermined by the
aggressive pricing of the larger, lower-cost firms. These important cost asym-
metries were not accommodated within the industry code, and this proved fatal
to its success.
The steel industry affords a more appropriate comparison. As in the sugar
industry, a consolidation near the tum of the century had created a dominant
firm with a near monopoly that by the 1930s had remained the market leader
notwithstanding a sizeable decline in market share over the intervening de-
cades. In granting firms differential voting power in its NIRA code, the steel
industry departed from the "onefirm, one vote" system even more sharply than
the sugar industry. U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel possessed 511 and 160
votes, respectively, in the code authority, while each of the other thirty-eight
firms possessed only 1 to 86 votes, depending upon firm size (National Recov-
eryAdministration 1934). Evidently, the steel firms had also learned the neces-
64. Ibid., 10 August 1933, 330-31.
65. Ibid., 31 August 1933,361.
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sity ofgiving greater voting power to the larger firms. As with the sugar indus-
try, a prior collusive experience may have determined the response to the New
Deal legislation. Lamoreaux (1985) has argued that U.S. Steel's policy after
1902, shortly after its formation, of cutting prices when demand was slack
taught the independents to curtail their output in recessions. That industry's
equivalent of the Sugar Institute was the Gary dinners, which served as an
avenue to notify the independents of U.S. Steel's intentions. History had thus
conditioned members to the benefits of an asymmetric cartel headed by U.S.
Steel. Baker (1989) has provided the quantitative evidence that the steel indus-
try was able to reap the collusive gains offered by the NIRA.
The AAA code strengthened not only the large firms but the coordinating
body itself. Discretion over statistical reports and auditing authority would be
transferred from the member firms to the board of directors. It would have
blanket, ex ante authority to conduct audits, rather than having to request audit
authority on a case-by-case basis. It was now empowered to employ public
accountants to make "periodic checks or audits ofrefiners' books and records
in order to determine whether ornot [the] Code is being observed" and "to call
on anyone or all members ofthe industry... for reports and statistics relating
to...matters concerning which the Board is entitled to have information under
this code." 67
These stronger powers were backed up with new sanctions for violations of
the agreement, including nonreporting ofstatistics orfailure to allow auditing.
First, since the proposedAAA code included government licensing ofall mem-
bers of the industry, a violation could result in the revocation of a license.
Second, the proposed AAA code was to be considered "a valid and binding
contract," with violations of the code constituting a breach of contract and
therefore making the violator liable for liquidated damages.68 These sanctions
replaced the, perhaps not credible, expulsion of a member refiner and the
often-used blackballing ofdownstream firms under the Sugar Institute.
The secretary ofagriculture rejected the proposed code on the grounds that
it did not protect consumer interests sufficiently.69 Delays in revising the pro-
posed refiners' code later ensued because the secretary considered marketing
agreements for raw sugar and beet sugar to be a higher priority. By July 1934
ASRC believed that the government would not enforce AAA codes,70 and no
other sugar refiners code was ever submitted under the AAA. Nevertheless, a
code of fair competition for a united sugar association that was to encompass
both beet and cane producers was drafted in 1935, and in August 1936, in the
wake ofthe Supreme CourtSugarInstitutedecision, a proposed reorganization
of the Sugar Institute was drawn up. The first agreement was silent on voting
67. Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, 31 August 1933,359.
68. Ibid., 359-60.
69. Place Correspondence, letter to Manolo Rionda, 27 July 1934, and accompanying memo
from Ellsworth Bunker, 24 July 1934.
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rights; the second maintained the same system as the AAA code. Both draft
agreements maintained the enhanced powers ofthe board ofdirectors to obtain
any statistics it required, with the sanction ofliquidated damages (in the 1935
draft set at 25 cents per hundred pounds, or about one-halfofper-unit variable
profits, of the relevant quantity). One hears echoes of Place's earlier call for
"delegating positive power-to some central authority" in the 1935 draft's
anointing ofthe executive director as the "judge ofviolations."71
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with how refiners learned to ensure the
exchange ofinformation among themselves, and how they faced difficulties in
inducing the sharing of certain types of information. Some surviving records
of the McCahan Sugar Refining and Molasses Company provide a window
into how the information that was exchanged was used at the firm level. In
several letters to McCahan's president, Place, who was responsible for all but
production and raw sugar purchases at McCahan,72 uses institute figures to
benchmark McCahan's practices or performance. For example, Place points
out that although McCahan's refined sugar stocks had increased from June
1930 to June 1931, institute figures revealed that its proportion of industry
stocks had declined.73 Industry statistics permitted a refiner to distinguish be-
tween change in conditions specific to the firm itself, and those common to the
industry. In this case, the information helped allay any McCahan fears that it
was losing sales to other firms through secret price concessions.
Benchmarking was applied to specific markets as well. Some institute fig-
ures were reported by states, and that information had never before been avail-
able. Due to the geographic dispersion of refiners, with overlapping market
areas, the information broken down by state could be a great help to a firm in
assessing its own performance. In another letter Place argued that McCahan
was not holding excessive stocks in Illinois because McCahan was selling 16.5
percent ofall sugars there but only holding 8.9 percent ofthe stocks there.74
Although perhaps unsurprising, such benchmarking is noteworthy as it is
consistent with the models on the competitive effects of information sharing.
In particular, information sharing increases the correlation of firm decisions
because firms are acting upon common information. This correlation occurs
even absent formal collusion by firms. Moreover, this benchmarking is related
to a possible efficiency gain ofinformation exchange, by reducing the chances
oferroneous firm decisions based upon poor information. In the previous ex-
ample, McCahan assessed its level of inventories based upon a comparison
with other refiners. Absent the Sugar Institute, McCahan might have been led
71. Both agreements are to be found in Place, Sugar Institute: Reorganization and Closing.
72. Testimony ofLouis Place, Transcript ofRecord, 2:827, District Court Record.
73. Place Correspondence, Costs and Melts, 10 June 1931.
74. Ibid., 22 July 1931.134 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
to reduce its inventories below that ofits competitors. Ifits competitors collec-
tively had better information, then McCahan's independent decision to lower
its inventories could hurt McCahan and market performance if stockouts oc-
curred.
75
The enhanced information exchange achieved by the Sugar Institute did not
survive it. Although firms could have shared information through the trade
press even after the dissolution of the Sugar Institute, this did not occur. An
examination ofthe Weekly StatisticalSugar Trade Journal for the years follow-
ing the Supreme Court's decision shows that the dissemination ofinformation
had returned to the preinstitute state. Estimates ofweekly deliveries and melt-
ings are reported. But information on the weekly sales of refined sugar, one
of the most elusive statistics, is nowhere to be seen. And there are no state-
level data.
One's initial inclination is to classify the Sugar Institute as a failure. It could
not avoid prosecution, which threat was one ofthe constraints ofthe economic,
legal, and political environment in which the institute operated. Thus, in the
end, the legal changes overshadowed any learning. The sugar refining industry
did learn how to manage incentives within an information-sharing agreement,
and more broadly, they learned the advantages such an organizational form
offered in advancing industry aims, such as collusion. But the Supreme Court
decision denied the industry that organizational form, at least as it was con-
ceived and implemented. It was as if the industry had learned how to use a
particular tool, and its value, and then that tool was taken away. Within the
longer historical context, the changing legal and political treatment of trade-
association activities first gave the sugar industry the opportunity to form and
operate the institute, and then took away much of the institute's perceived
power by limiting its activities.
Like a constitution, the code did not completely specify all future decisions;
rather, it specified how those future decisions were to be made. Thus the Sugar
Institute was at least a partial success because its structure enabled future deci-
sions to be made that advanced the institute's original aims. In particular, the
institute established a framework in which learning and adaptation could take
place. First, the institute's organizational structure was sufficiently flexible to
allow the institute and its requirements of members to change as members
learned about the strengths and weaknesses of the original institute require-
ments. Second, the institute enabled firms to learn more about their market and
their own performance through the information exchange that was accom-
plished under the institute's auspices. Third, although some of the lessons
about organizing information exchange could not be put into practice due to
political and legal constraints, those lessons were nevertheless learned.
75. This argument can be advanced without invoking stockouts. Since inventories serve to
smooth production and thereby minimize costs, an inventory decision that turns out to be a mistake
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Appendix
Code ofEthics ofthe Sugar Institute, Inc.
Among the purposes for which this Institute was formed were the following:
To promote a high standard of business ethics in the industry; to eliminate
trade abuses; to promote uniformity and certainty in business customs and
practices; and to promote the service ofthe industry to the Public.
Accordingly, the organization of this Institute was a frank recognition, in
and of itself, that customs and practices had grown up in the industry which
were unsound and unbusinesslike, and which were harmful to producers and
consumers alike. These customs and practices had resulted in confusion in the
trade and discrimination as between purchasers, with a consequent uneven and
uneconomic distribution of sugar to the public. The more important result to
the industry was a demoralization and restriction of the retail trade in sugar
and a retardation ofthe normal increase ofconsumption.
Believing that the trade will welcome a rectification ofthose business meth-
ods ofthe industry which have served to promote discrimination between pur-
chasers; and believing that the public will be better served ifthe present chan-
nels of distribution are preserved and enlarged by maintaining equality of
business opportunity among merchants of sugar; and believing that the mem-
bers of the industry will recognize that it is in the interest of the industry to
encourage and promote the wider distribution of its product to the end of in-
creasing its consumption;
The Institute declares its policy to be founded upon, and recommends to its
members the adoption ofbusiness methods in accordance with, the following
principles, to wit:
1. All discriminations between customers should be abolished. To that end,
sugar should be sold only upon open prices and terms publicly announced.
2. The business ofthe sugar refining industry is that ofrefining a raw product,
the price ofwhich to the industry is the controlling factor in the price which
the industry receives for its own refined product; and the industry as a pur-
chaser of raw sugar receives no concessions for quantity purchased. Con-
cessions made by the industry for the quantity of refined sugar purchased
have resulted in discrimination between customers, which discrimination
the Institute believes it to be in the interest ofthe industry, ofthe trade and
of the public to avoid. The Institute accordingly condemns as discrimina-
tory, and in so far as this industry is concerned, as unbusinesslike, uneco-
nomic and unsound, concessions made to purchasers on the basis ofquan-
tity purchased.
3. The following trade practices ifnot uniformly employed with all customers
of a refiner are discriminatory. Furthermore, if not secretly employed they
will ofnecessity be generally demanded, with the result that they must then
be uniformly employed or abandoned. Ifuniformly employed they amount136 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
to a general price concession which should frankly take the form ofa price
reduction. The Institute condemns them as unethical except when practiced
openly; as discriminatory unless uniformly employed; and in any event as
wasteful and unbusinesslike.
a. Variations from the open and publicly announced prices and terms, in-
cluding (but without limiting the generality ofthis clause) the following:
Special allowances by way of discounts, brokerage, storage or advertis-
ing; variations from openly announced grade or package differentials;
reduction or substitution ofgrades or packings; delayed billings; full dis-
counts in cases of delayed payment; and rebates or other allowances by
any name or ofany nature.
b. Split billings, except on cars moving on an 80,000 lb. minimum and rate.
c. The use ofdifferential rates on consignments, orotherwise than on direct
shipments over differential routes at customers' request.
d. Payment of brokerage where any part thereof inures to the benefit of
the purchaser.
e. Storage76 ofsugarin warehouses in which customers orbrokers are inter-
ested, or with which they are in any way affiliated.
f. Allotments to brokers running beyond the close of business of the day
on which an advance in price is announced by the refiner.
g. Special services to customers without appropriate charges therefor.
h. The sale ofsecondhand sugar by refiners.
i. Sales for export under contracts which do not provide for shipment out
ofthe country.
4. The factors which enter into and determine the cost of his product for the
refiner are so largely outside his control, and the probable margin of his
profit so small, as to render highly speculative and unsound the giving by
him ofoptions to purchase his sugar. Furthermore, unless equally available
to all customers alike, the giving ofoptions is discriminatory. The Institute
condemns the giving ofoptions by refiners.
5. In the interest ofa more even distribution to the trade, the Institute recom-
mends that sugar shall be consigned only to recognized detention points for
reshipment, or to recognized markets and then in care ofrailroad or steam-
ship lines or to public77 warehouses, and that the control ofthe sugar shall
remain with the refiner.
6. The Institute recommends the use by members of uniform contracts to be
adopted by the Institute for Eastern, Southern and Western markets.
78
76. Subparagraph e originally read "Storage of sugar in ·customers' warehouses" and was
amended to read as printed above by resolution adopted 2 May 1929.
77. The words "or brokers," appearing before the word "warehouses," were striken out by reso-
lution adopted 2 May 1929.
78. The Code ofEthics is reproduced from United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 Fed. Sup. 817,
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Comment Margaret Levenstein
David Genesove and Wallace Mullin's essay on the Sugar Institute makes an
important contribution to our understanding of firm learning by focusing our
attention on an important, but oft ignored, subject, the learning that firms do
about organizational design. Most ofus implicitly assume that the most impor-
tant learning that firms undertake is learning about new technologies, with per-
haps some passing concern given to learning about using existing technology
(such as learning by doing). But the profitable adoption of new technologies
often requires organizational innovation as well. Even when we do concern
ourselves with organizational innovation, our first inclination is to follow
Chandler (1977) and others, and focus on organizational innovation within the
firm. But as Lamoreaux (1985) has shown, the profitable adoption ofnew tech-
nologies may also require organizational changes at the industry level as well.
Firms actively try to shape industry structure through the design of interfirm
organizations and interactions. But to do so successfully requires learning:
learning about the other firms in the industry and learning about the sometimes
less-than-obvious incentive properties ofdifferent interfirm organizations.
Margaret Levenstein is assistant professor of economics at the University of Michigan and a
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The simplest and most obvious types of interfirm interaction are those in-
tended to facilitate collusion, and collusion seems to have been the primary
purpose of the Sugar Institute. Collusion is undoubtedly difficult to achieve.
As Stigler (1964) and others have frequently emphasized, collusion is easily
undermined by cheating. Many economists have presumed that the difficulties
that firms face in colluding would force them to abandon the attempt. But in
many industries firms have had a more imaginative response. They tum their
creative capabilities toward experimentation with various collusive schemes,
learning about the incentive properties ofthese schemes, learning about their
legality, learning about the otherfirms in the industry as they observe responses
to each new scheme.
The case of the Sugar Institute provides a useful example of the kinds of
experimentation and learning firms undertake in an attempt to find a stable
collusive arrangement. It also provides insight into the limits to the experimen-
tation undertaken, the limits of the learning that sugar firms did during this
period. The Sugar Institute's learning was constrained by its own "mental
model" ofthe sugar industry, by its own implicit model of how to respond to
problems of excess capacity and falling prices. Genesove and Mullin suggest
that the 1887 consolidation of the industry was a critical learning experience
for the industry. Following Havemeyer's creation of the Sugar Trust, sugar
firms formed a mental model oftheir own industry. That model suggested that
the best way to respond to excess capacity and falling prices was consolidation.
When it became clear that that solution was prohibited by antitrust law, sugar
firms turned to the next best thing. They looked to close coordination that
would, as nearly as possible, allow them to replicate consolidation.
Thus we can see that learning does not take place as a smooth or continuous
process. Rather there are critical moments when a mental model is formed,
and without a "paradigmatic shift," future learning takes place within that men-
tal model (Kuhn 1970). What is striking about the case ofthe sugar industry is
that, during the period covered in this paper, neither episodes of competition
nor episodes ofcooperation appear to have provided the basis for a paradigma-
tic shift that would have allowed sugar firms to develop a new mental model.
Such a model mighthave encouraged them to focus theirenergy on othercoop-
erative tools or strategies as the basis for an increase in profits.
While a different mental model might have led the Sugar Institute to direct
more of its energies toward learning about technological change, advertising,
and product development, the learning that the members of the institute did
seems to have been strictly incremental modifications oftheir existing "mental
model." Their experience with interfirm organization led to no radical or para-
digmatic shift in their understanding of how to protect their profit margins.
Within that context, however, they do seem to have learned about one another,
and about the incentive properties of various institutional forms with which
the institute experimented.
The Sugar Institute experimented with a variety of tools to support collu-140 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
sion. Probably the single most important tool was the public announcement of
prices. Like other industries adopting the popular "open-pricing" schemes of
the period, the sugar firms hoped that publicly announced prices would prove
focal, dulling price competition without explicit price setting. But the institute
did not rest with one simple tool.
The institute tried to eliminate mechanisms through which secret price cuts
could be given. The institute rules banned rebates and special allowances on
transportation charges and limited contract duration to a maximum of thirty
days. And it banned vertical integration into certain aspects of sugar distribu-
tion. These rules then required that the institute collect information regarding
members' compliance with them. So it had to learn which information would
be necessary to determine compliance. It began by asking for regular reporting
of information about vertical relationships, then turned to special investiga-
tions on an ad hoc basis. Initially these special investigations were undertaken
by an institute investigator, but when firms resisted providing information to
him, the institute began to use third-party auditors, like Haskins and Sells, to
collect the necessary information.
The institute's most ambitious, but apparently least successful, scheme
called for the reporting of all sales. While the institute was legally prohibited
from setting output quotas or market shares, sugar firms seem to have had an
idea ofthe share ofindustry output to which any firm was entitled. Ifthe Sugar
Institute could compute and report total sales in any period, individual firms
could calculate their market share and use that as an indicator ofcheating (as
in Green and Porter 1984). While the institute tried a variety of schemes to
induce disclosure of sales, and certainly learned something in the process, in
the end it did not succeed in making this particular tool workable.
The institute members learned to make information sharing self-enforcing,
at least some of the time, by using an exclusionary disclosure rule in which
only those who provided information received reports from the institute. The
institute adopted this policy after months ofattempting to use "moral suasion"
to convince member firms that it was in their individual interest to reveal infor-
mation to the institute. When the institute learned that it could not, given the
necessary weakness of its organizational structure, provide all firms with suf-
ficient incentives to report the requested information, it tried other tactics. Ex-
clusionary disclosure was a more credible threat than expulsion, which the
institute threatened but was never willing to implement. Expulsion from the
institute would have harmed the remaining members as much as the ostracized
firm. Because it was clear that such a threat would never be implemented, it,
as we would expect, had no effect on firm decision making.
The institute also experimented with the creation ofa more centralized orga-
nizational form. Two years after the institute was founded, it created the En-
forcement Committee. Even the Enforcement Committee's decisions had to be
incenti.ve compatible, as participation in the institute was voluntary. But pro-
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comply with requests for information, Genesove and Mullin tell us, changed
incentives sufficiently to induce the reporting ofinformation. Perhaps the pub-
lic precommitments ofmembers to support the committee changed the incen-
tives of member firms. The precommitment itself created a new punishment,
since firms had put up their promise as bond. The use of such a technique
reflects learning, or at least experimentation, on the part ofmember firms with
tools to influence the incentives ofthe institute members.
The decision to create the Enforcement Committee reflects continued exper-
imentation by institute members with the overall design oftheir industry asso-
ciation. While their choices regarding the design ofthe association were lim-
ited by antitrust law, they did learn from the experience in the institute enough
about one another to understand that a different voting mechanism might have
been able to achieve more satisfactory results. The institute tried repeatedly to
create a decision mechanism in which individual firms ceded their veto power
to the institute, but given the legal structure under which the institute operated,
simple centralization was destined to fail. We can observe further organiza-
tional learning in this area by comparing the operations of the institute to the
industry code that it proposed under theAgriculturalAdjustmentAct. Someof
the differences between the two undoubtedly reflect the dramatic changes in
both the macroeconomy and the regulatory environment in the intervening
years. But the differences in the proposed codes in 1934 and the design ofthe
Sugar Institute in 1926suggest that member firms had learned, and were using
the new opportunity and the new environment to put into effect changes that
they had learned would allow them to better achieve their goals. Sugar firms
understood that the lack ofpowerto impose sanctions limited the effectiveness
of the institute. They hoped to solve the problem with tools made available
in the new legal environment, which allowed them to propose a code with
strong sanctions.
The new code also changed votingprocedures, giving greaterweight to large
firms. Again, this suggests learning about the internal political dynamics of
their own industry. Codes adopted in other industries at the same time tried to
protect the interests of small and medium-sized firms with a one-firm, one-
vote rule at the same time that the sugar industry, having learned the futility of
such a system, appears to have abandoneditin favor ofone reflecting the politi-
cal realities ofthe industry. The new code also centralized decision making in
the board to a greater degree than under the institute rules. Again, this was not
something obviously required or induced by changes in external conditions,
but rather reflects learning and continued experimentation by industry partici-
pants. Whether such a voting rule would have allowed implementation of an
incentive scheme that would have induced further information sharing we will
never know, but it was another,creative attempt to achieve those long-
standing objectives.
Whatdo welearn about the feasibility ofcollusion from Genesove and Mul-
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institute was not able to achieve information sharing that one might well think
crucial to collusive success. So we must ask, did the inability to share sales
information have any impact on collusion? Or should we revise our ideas about
how much or what kinds ofinformation firms need to have to collude?
There are other, important types of interfirm interaction often pursued by
industry associations. These include attempts to increasedemand for the indus-
try's product through advertising, standardization, and regulation of product
quality. They also include attempts to improve production efficiency by im-
proving the information that firms have about fluctuations in demand and shar-
ing information about, or even jointly engaging in, technological innovation.
As becomes clearin Genesove and Mullin's paper, the collusive and efficiency-
enhancing functions ofinterfirm organizations are not mutually exclusive. And
in their story we observe experimentation with organizational design to better
achieve both types of objectives. Genesove and Mullin suggest that informa-
tion sharing helped to rationalize production and economize on inventory car-
rying costs by allowing firms to estimate demand more accurately. They also
suggest that firms used shared information as a benchmark to evaluate their
own employees' success at marketing sugar and perhaps the company's own
market strategy. However, the "mental model" ofthe industry held by the insti-
tute and its member firms seems to have led them to downplay the importance
ofthese other activities-except when questioned by the antitrust authorities.
In fact, in the case ofadvertising, Genesove and Mullin suggest that rather than
learn how to achieve cooperative outcomes, firms learned about the limits of
the usefulness ofsharing information and resources. While Genesove and Mul-
lin's description is brief, the advertising activities of the institute look quite
beneficial to the industry. But these benefits were captured almost completely
by the largest firms. Smaller firms learned that they were getting taxed to pay
for advertising that primarily benefited larger firms, and after eight years they
opted out. Advertising was not enough of a priority to the institute to experi-
ment with different structures that might have allowed these activities to con-
tinue.
The decision to abandon the institute in 1936, when it became clear that
antitrust law would limit its ability to facilitate collusion, suggests that mem-
bers' mental model of the industry, and the role of an industry association in
their model, had changed little over the previous nine years. There seems to
have been no appreciation of the potential importance of the association as a
repository ofshared experience. One ofthe difficulties ofinterfirm learning is
that there is not necessarily a good "home" for the learning that takes place.
The institute itselfprovided such a home for a short period, but it did not have
the longevity necessary to provide a long-term resting place, where knowledge
could be stored, accumulated, synthesized over time as the external environ-
ment changed.
Institute members also never seem to have explored its potential as an agent
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report that there was no significant technological change between the Sugar
Trust and the Sugar Institute. Was this because the possibilities for innovation
were not there? Or because the collusive structure of the industry diminished
the incentives for, or even impeded, technological change? Is there any evi-
dence that information exchanged through the Sugar Institute increased pro-
ductivity in sugar, say by smoothing production orcutting inventory costs? Was
this a complement or a substitute for other kinds of productivity-enhancing
technological change? This particular case cannot answer these questions, but
it does remind us that learning is not always Progress.
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